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Abstract
In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in
order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of
rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not
voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with popula-
tion size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to the importance of social
interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the
electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects.
(iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in
communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, while the opposite
is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the model
predicts less volatile turnout for the latter type of communities.
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1 Introduction
What motivates citizens to vote is one of the fundamental questions of political science
and public economics. Since the early writings of Downs (1957) and later on Ledyard
(1984), the rational-choice theory puts the desire of citizens to affect the election out-
come as the main driving factor of their voting behavior. But, since the probability to
actually change the outcome is very small, the instrumental view of voting generates
the paradox of not voting,1 which has led many researchers to propose different reasons
that drive voting incentives.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a formal model of voting as a signaling
device, and, in doing so, to provide a rational choice model which does not generate the
paradox of not voting. Moreover, by integrating the instrumental view and signaling
in a coherent framework, we aim at analyzing how these two motives interact. The
main idea is that citizens possess unobserved characteristics, such as their preferences
for public goods or their degree of altruism, which they signal to others through voting.
If informative, these signals benefit both the sender and the receiver, because they
facilitate the creation of mutually beneficial cooperations or because they increase the
trust in an already given relation. Hence, in addition to standard electoral incentives
of the instrumental view of voting, citizens have also signaling incentives.
More specifically, we build upon the model of voting in a finite-agent economy
proposed by Bo¨rgers (2004). We consider a two-period extension of this model, where
individuals are divided into neighborhoods. In the first period citizens decide to vote
or not and they also observe whether their neighbors voted. In the second period,
after mutual agreement, each citizen can form partnerships with any of her neighbors.2
These partnerships represent, in a stylized way, social interactions which, by their
nature, have to take place in the neighborhood, and which are not easily replaced
by anonymous market exchange. We mainly think of two kinds of examples for such
interactions. Firstly, notice that neighbors often cooperate to provide local public goods
such as a sports club, a recreation facility or the care and maintenance of communal
spaces. Secondly, our model also captures mutual exchanges of favors such as providing
information about job opportunities, or taking kids to school.
Citizens derive utility from both the outcome of the election, as in the instrumental
1For a formal treatment, see Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985).
2An alternative interpretation of the second stage is that each citizen has already a network of
friends and each one of them decides whether to increase the degree of interaction with her friends or
not.
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view, and the formation of partnerships in the second stage. Their utilities, however,
are a function of two unobservable characteristics: (i) their cost of voting and (ii) a
preference parameter, the latter affecting the utility from both the election outcome
and the partnership. Referring to the examples mentioned above, the parameter can
be interpreted as either representing the intensity of preferences for public goods or as
representing the degree of one’s altruism. The crucial assumption is that the utility of
the election outcome is correlated with the utility of the partnership. This captures
the idea that preferences for national and local public goods are aligned, and that the
willingness to incur private costs to promote an outcome which also benefits others
should be the same no matter whether the benefit is local or national. Thus, our
preference parameter should broadly be interpreted as a measure of ‘public-mindedness’
of the individual, which is expressed both in the national election and in everyday social
interaction.
Because it is costly to engage in partnerships, a citizen is willing to cooperate with
her neighbor only if the latter is sufficiently attractive as an interaction partner. For
example, in the case of the provision of public goods, this requires that the potential
partner has a high intensity of preferences for public goods, since otherwise, the partner
is likely to behave as a free rider. Similarly, engaging in an exchange of favors with a
very selfish person leaves one prone to be exploited. Therefore, signaling one’s ‘public-
mindedness’ can thus have significant value when compared with relatively low cost
activities, like voting. As a result, citizens’ voting incentives are enhanced by their
willingness to signal their preference for cooperation to their neighbors. Our model
formalizes this intuition and shows that the effects on direct electoral incentives can
actually be large.
In the two-stage game so defined, we find the perfect Bayesian equilibria, and we
analyze the most interesting case: stable interior equilibria with signaling, that is stable
equilibria where a fraction of agents from every type votes. We show that such equilibria
exist and we compute their comparative statics. The main results are as follows:
1. The presence of signaling strictly increases voting incentives and electoral turnout
when compared to models without signaling effects.
2. Even in economies with very large populations, the value of signaling does not
tend to zero and therefore the paradox of not voting does not arise.
3. Communities with closer personal ties and higher level of social interaction present
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higher turnout.
4. Due to signaling, electoral incentives may exhibit “bandwagon” effects: The ben-
efit of voting may increase with turnout, so that one’s willingness to vote increases
if the expected participation rate increases. To the best of our knowledge, this
is in contrast to existing papers on rational voting, where the benefit of voting is
always decreasing with turnout due to the decreasing pivotal probability.
5. Signaling incentives interact with direct electoral incentives so that even a small
change in the importance of the election may generate a sizable increase in
turnout. This is because turnout may be highly sensitive to signaling effects.
In terms of empirical predictions, the model suggests that communities with high
cost of social interaction should have lower volatility of turnout in response to
changes in the importance of elections than communities with lower costs of so-
cial interactions. In terms of policy, the model predicts that increasing the value
of the election (through increasing the awareness of citizens about the policy
agenda or through political advertising) has a higher impact on electoral turnout
in communities with lower interaction costs and closer community ties.
In order to put these results into perspective, it is worth discussing in what kind of
societies we expect the key elements of our model, observability of the act of voting and
neighborhood interactions, to be particularly important. Concerning the first element,
it appears that in small communities, like villages, citizens are more likely to observe
each other voting than in big cities. However, in most countries, elections are organized
locally so that a polling station only serves a narrowly defined neighborhood. Therefore,
as long as citizens cast their vote in person and not online or by post, even in large
cities, voting is observable for neighbors at least to some extent.
Second, social interactions clearly are of prominent importance in traditional, rural
societies where markets are under-developed and where every member strongly depends
on the co-operation with others. Conversely, anonymous markets are more widespread
and may to some extent supplant personalized interactions in sophisticated, urban
environments. Thus, it seems that in a modern society, signaling one’s characteristics
is more important in small communities, say villages, where personal interaction is
more common than in big cities.3 We maintain, however, that local social interactions
as we describe them have not lost relevance in modern and urban societies. Rather,
3See also the empirical result by Funk (2010) discussed below.
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we think that in suburban environments and even in big cities, there is still substantial
scope for the kind of local public goods and personal favors for which signaling is
relevant. To take the examples given above, volunteering in a sports club, cleaning a
neighborhood park, or taking kids to school will be important whatever the level of
economic development. Since such neighborhood interactions are much easier if they
take place inside a network of trust, a locally produced signal remains valuable in an
urban context, albeit it is likely to be still more important in traditional societies or
small communities.
Our model captures in a simple way the interaction between electoral and social
incentives, which we believe is an important driving force of voting incentives. This view
corresponds to a growing number of papers where it is argued that social considerations
and pressures play an important role in citizens’ voting decisions. Overbye (1995),
Posner (1998) and Bufacchi (2001) also argue that reputation and signaling reasons can
account for the voting behavior of citizens in modern democracies, but they provide no
formal analysis. By constructing a rigorous model formalizing this idea, we are able to
make testable predictions which relate the voting behavior to the social conditions of
individuals.
Funk (2005) analyzes a voting model with signaling incentives. However, there are
two main differences between her paper and ours. First, in her model voting takes place
in order to signal one’s willingness to comply with social norms which are assumed
to be exogenous, whereas in our model social interactions arise endogenously from
an agreement among individuals. In that sense, one may interpret the second stage
of our model as a micro-foundation of the kind of ‘civic duty’ used in Funk (2005).
Second, the main focus of our analysis is the interaction between electoral and signaling
incentives, while Funk (2005) ignores electoral incentives and focuses on the impact of
new technologies, which reduce the cost of voting, on signaling incentives and turnout.
Other papers, such as Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2007), Fowler (2006) and Rotem-
berg (2009), argue that social preferences and altruism are the main driving forces of
voting behavior. While our model does not focus on this explanation, one of the inter-
pretations of the citizens’ unobserved parameter is that it represents altruism. However,
this parameter generates two voting effects in our model: one direct and one indirect,
through signaling. The second channel, which is our main focus of study, is absent from
the social preferences literature.
There exist several other theoretical approaches to voting incentives. According to
the ethical voting literature (Harsanyi 1980, Coate and Conlin 2004, Feddersen and
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Sandroni 2006) voters decide on the ground of moral principles and they derive util-
ity from adhering to them. The leader-follower theories (Uhlaner 1989, Morton 1991,
Shachar and Nalebuff 1999, Herrera and Martinelli 2006) emphasize the role of leaders
and their ability to impose sanctions or to provide rewards in motivating social groups
to participate in elections. Fowler (2005) argues that individuals imitate the voting
behavior of their social circle, which can lead to turnout cascades. Castanheira (2003)
points out that voting benefit can be high, since the implemented platform after the
elections depends not only on the winner, but also on the margin of victory. Papers on
expressive voting (Brennan and Hamlin 1998, Engelen 2006, Kamenica and Egan Brad
2012, Degan 2013) assert that voting is a consumption good in itself, because it allows
one to affirm her own beliefs and values. In a similar approach, Aldashev (2010) argues
that individuals become politically informed in spite of low pivotal probability, because
they have both consumption (political discussions within their social circle) and invest-
ment (meeting new people through a common discussion topic) benefits. Contributions
to the literature on social norms (e.g., Coleman 1990) point out that voting is a public
good in itself and show how social norms are used to overcome the associated free-rider
problem.4
We do not question the relevance of these approaches. Rather, the theory presented
here provides an additional rationale for voting, which may complement the arguments
put forward in existing literature, and which has not been analyzed so far.
In the empirical and experimental research on voter participation, there is a num-
ber of results which are consistent with the predictions generated by our model. An
increasing number of papers finds that social pressure, close community ties and voter
participation increase the voting incentives for community members. Gerber, Green,
and Larimer (2008) show through a large-scale field experiment that turnout was sub-
stantially higher among people who received a letter before the elections, which was
explaining that whether they voted or not would be made public among the neighbors.
Funk (2010) finds that voter turnout was negatively affected in small communities of
Switzerland after the introduction of postal voting. Her explanation is that although
postal voting decreased the voting costs, it also removed signaling benefit of voting,
which was substantial in small communities. Gerber and Rogers (2009) find that a
message publicizing high expected turnout is more effective at motivating people to
vote than a message publicizing low expected turnout. This result, which obtains in
4For more complete surveys, see Aldrich (1993), Blais (2000), Dhillon and Peralta (2002), Feddersen
(2004).
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spite of lower pivotal probability with higher turnout, is consistent with the signaling
benefit and the bandwagon effect of our model. Similarly, an experiment of sequential
voting by Großer and Schram (2006) shows that high turnout of early voters increases
late voters’ turnout.
Several papers find evidence of a positive relationship between the size of social
network or formal group memberships of an individual on the one hand, and voting
or other forms of political participation of this individual on the other hand (Lake
and Huckfeldt 1998, Leighley 1996, Knack 1992, Kenny 1992, McClurg 2003).5 Last
but not least, there is empirical evidence in favor of our result that communities with
closer personal ties and higher level of social interaction present higher turnout: Oliver
(2000) finds that city size decreases civic involvement and turnout in local elections
in the United States, controlling for individual characteristics. Cox, Rosenbluth, and
Thies (1998) show empirically for Japan that social density increases turnout in close
elections, and as a reason they argue that party campaigns focus on close elections and
on socially dense communities where campaign efforts are more productive thanks to
denser social networks. Remmer (2010) shows that turnout decreases with community
size both in presidential and mayoral elections in Costa Rica. In the same vein, Monroe
(1977) finds higher turnout in rural areas than in urban areas in the state of Illinois.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two presents the model, Section three pro-
vides the equilibrium analysis, Section four presents the main comparative statics and
results and Section five includes the final comments and conclusions. Most proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
There are N individuals, i = 1, 2, ..., N , and two political parties, A and B. Each
individual is summarized by three characteristics. The first one is the preferred party
of the individual i: Ri ∈ {A,B}. The second one is her cost of voting, ci ∈ [cmin, cmax]
with 0 ≤ cmin < cmax. The last characteristic is whether she is of high or low type,
τ(i) ∈ {H,L}, which refers to the importance the individual i attaches to decisions
taken in the public domain. Each characteristic of any individual i is a random variable.
All three characteristics are independently distributed for each individual and across
individuals. The preferred party of any individual i is A with probability 1/2 and B with
5For other papers which study the relation between social interactions and political participation,
see for instance Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1995) and Schram and Sonnemans (1996).
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probability 1/2.6 The cost of voting ci of any individual i is distributed according to the
cdf F on the support [cmin, cmax] with the pdf f which is positive on all of the support.
Finally, any individual is of high type, τ(i) = H, with probability q and of low type,
τ(i) = L, with probability 1 − q. Each individual privately knows her characteristics.
The distributions of individuals’ characteristics are common knowledge.
There are two periods. In the first period, the election occurs in which an individual
chooses to vote for her preferred party or to abstain.7 The winner is determined by a
simple majority rule. In case of a tie, each party wins with probability 1/2.
An individual i’s payoff from the first period is as follows: Her benefit is w1ατ(i)
if her preferred party wins and 0 otherwise. w1 is a parameter which measures the
importance of the election, such as the value of the public decision to be determined
by the winner of the election. We assume that both types care about the result of the
election, as measured by the parameter ατ(i), and that a high type individual cares more
about it than a low type individual, i.e. αH > αL > 0. Her cost is ci if she votes and 0
otherwise. Hence, if she votes and her preferred party wins, her payoff is w1ατ(i) − ci.
If she abstains and her preferred party wins, her payoff is w1ατ(i). If she votes and her
preferred party loses, her payoff is −ci. If she abstains and her preferred party loses,
her payoff is 0.
In the second period, social interactions occur in neighborhoods in the form of
pairwise matches. All neighborhoods are of equal size and each one of them contains
n individuals. Therefore, each voter has n − 1 neighbors. After observing whether
each one of her neighbors voted or not, an individual i chooses to match or not with
each individual j = 1, 2, ..., n, j 6= i. If both i and j agree to match with each other,
they match together. Otherwise, a match does not occur. Matches are assumed to be
independent and non-exclusive. This means that each agent can potentially interact
with all of her neighbors if they also want to interact with her, and that the utility of
each match is not affected by the other matches.
Every individual wants to interact only with neighbors who have the same party
preference as her. That is, e.g., a Democrat receives utility only from interacting with
other Democrats and a Republican from interacting with other Republicans. Indeed, as
most people usually interact with people of the same ideology (or similar ideologies), this
6In Subsection 4.3, we discuss implications of relaxing this assumption.
7Since voting for the other party is a weakly dominated strategy, we do not consider this strategy.
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assumption is empirically plausible,8 but it is not crucial for our results.9 We assume
that each individual does not know their neighbors’ party identity before voting. Only
after the second stage starts they find out each other’s party identities and choose to
interact among similarly-minded neighbors. This is motivated by the fact that people
usually do not advertise their political preferences publicly. However, when individuals
consider with whom to enter into close social contact, they typically will learn the
political views of the other person. In the context of the present model, this will
arise in a game where neighbors inform each other about their party preferences just
before they decide to interact. Since each individual benefits only from interacting
with neighbors of the same party, everyone has an incentive to reveal this information
truthfully.
Formally, individuals with different party preferences receive a negative payoff from
the interaction, irrespectively of their types. Contrary to that, individual i’s payoff
from a match with an individual j, conditional on both supporting the same party,
depends both on her own type and her neighbor’s type. We adopt the following simple
functional representation for the interaction payoff:
w2ατ(i)(ατ(j) − d) (1)
where d is the cost of the social interaction and w2 measures the importance of social
interactions. Therefore, d is the cost that one bears in order to carry out the interaction
with her neighbor (e.g. the cost of time for cleaning up communal spaces). We assume
that αL < d < αH , so that it is beneficial for everyone to interact with high types
and it is detrimental to interact with low types. Hence, in the perfect information case
(when an individual knows the type of all her neighbors), i would agree to match with
an individual j if and only if j prefers the same party and is of high type. Moreover,
since αH > αL, if a match has a positive expected payoff, a high type individual has a
higher expected payoff from this match than a low type individual.
So, equation (1) captures in a simple way the net benefits of the social interaction:
High (low) types generate positive (negative) payoff externalities and even more so for
8For example, Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2002) observe that the social network of an indi-
vidual consists largely of people with similar political views. Mutz (2002) shows that people whose
social networks involve more political disagreement are less likely to vote.
9In an earlier version of the paper (see Aytimur, Boukouras, and Schwager 2012) we assumed that
individuals derive utility from interacting with all neighbors, irrespectively of their party preference,
and we obtained the same results.
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other high types. This is a reasonable assumption, as we should expect people who care
more about local public goods, e.g. those who have higher marginal utility from a cleaner
public space, to benefit more from interacting with like-minded individuals. Similarly,
such agents tend to suffer more when they interact with disinterested individuals since
the latter behave as free riders, or do not return favors.10
Equation (1) provides i’s payoff from a match with j, when j’s type is known to i.
However, since j’s type is private information, i needs to evaluate her expected payoff,
after she has updated her belief about j’s type. Since a high type individual gets a higher
benefit in case of the victory of her preferred party, her voting behavior can be a signal
about her type, given that she is more likely to vote than a low type individual.11 The
signal can be valuable since, because of the payoff externalities, agents want to match
with a high type individual, and not with a low type individual. Therefore, agents
interact with each other if and only if they have posterior beliefs that the other one is
of high type with a high enough probability. The formulation of beliefs and expected
payoffs, and the analysis of best responses are provided in the following section.
As in Bo¨rgers (2004), we make two symmetry assumptions about the voting strategy.
We assume that it does not depend on the individual’s preferred party12 and that all
individuals play the same strategy of the form s : {H,L} × [cmin, cmax]→ {0, 1} where
si(τ(i), ci) = 0 (respectively 1) means that an individual i abstains (respectively votes)
if she is of type τ(i) and her cost of voting is ci.
We assume that every individual i plays the same matching strategy of the form13
I : {0, 1} × {A,B} × {A,B} → {0, 1} with regards to an individual j, i 6= j. Thus,
I(sj, Ri, Rj) = 0 (respectively 1) means that an individual i does not agree (respectively
agrees) to match with an individual j if her party preference is Ri, the individual j’s
party preference is Rj and her voting decision is sj. Hence, a match between individuals
i and j occurs if and only if I(sj, Ri, Rj)I(si, Rj, Ri) = 1.
10While the formulation in (1) is chosen to capture the main features of a social interaction, it also
helps to simplify the algebra that follows substantially. We should note, however, that our results do
not depend critically on this specific formulation of the second-stage payoff; see Subsection 4.3.
11Using the same ατ(i) in both periods means that the preferences for the election outcome and social
interactions are perfectly correlated. While this appears to be a strong assumption, relaxing it would
make the analysis much more involved, without being likely to yield interesting additional insights.
The reason is that, as long as there is enough correlation between both preference parameters, the first
period behavior still has some informative value for the second period, and hence signaling is useful.
12This is a standard and natural assumption as long as individuals are ex-ante equally likely to prefer
either party. See also Goeree and Großer (2007).
13The assumption that the matching strategy does not depend on the individual’s own type (high
or low) and own voting decision is not a restriction. The proof is available upon request.
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Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, we proceed by
backward induction.
3 Equilibrium analysis
We first analyze the second stage of the game where agents decide whether to interact
with each of their neighbors or not, after observing their voting behavior. Subsequently,
we will use the equilibria of the second stage in order to analyze the first stage.
3.1 Second-stage equilibrium
Recall from the previous section that equation (1) provides i’s payoff from a match
with j, conditional on both supporting the same party. If i and j support different
parties, they do not match. Hence, in this subsection, we consider only individuals i
and j supporting the same party, i.e. Ri = Rj. The expected payoff of i from a match
with j, when j’s type is private information and conditional on j’s voting decision, is
given by:
w2ατ(i) [λ(sj)(αH − d) + (1− λ(sj))(αL − d)] I(si, Rj, Ri)I(sj, Ri, Rj) (2)
Here, λ(sj) is the posterior belief that a neighbor who voted (sj = 1) or did not vote
(sj = 0) is of typeH. Notice that we do not need to define party-specific posterior beliefs
since voting strategies are assumed to be symmetric with respect to preferred party. For
later use, we define λ(1) = λH , which is the posterior belief that a neighbor, who voted,
is of high type, and 1 − λ(0) = λL, which is the posterior belief that a neighbor, who
did not vote, is of low type. I(sj, Ri, Rj), as given in the previous section, denotes the
decision of agent i whether to match with neighbor j or not, conditional on the latter’s
voting behavior and on both individuals’ preferred parties. The overall second stage
utility of i from all her neighbors is simply the summation over all possible interactions
in her neighborhood:
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
{
w2ατ(i) [λ(sj)(αH − d) + (1− λ(sj))(αL − d)] I(si, Rj, Ri)I(sj, Ri, Rj)
}
The best response of i in the second stage of the game depends on the voting behavior
of her neighbors and her posterior beliefs regarding their type. By (2), it is clear that the
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best response for i is to match with every neighbor who generates a positive interaction
payoff and not to interact if the expected payoff is negative. Therefore, conditional on
Ri = Rj, her best response is to interact if [λ(sj)(αH − d) + (1− λ(sj))(αL − d)] I(si, Rj, Ri) >
0, not to interact if [λ(sj)(αH − d) + (1− λ(sj))(αL − d)] I(si, Rj, Ri) < 0 and either if
the expression is zero.
The above analysis suggests that, depending on the beliefs and the parameters αH ,
αL and d, there will be different equilibria of the second stage, which depend on the
signs of the expressions λHαH + (1− λH)αL − d and (1− λL)αH + λLαL − d. For the
remainder of the paper we focus on the most interesting of these equilibria, the one
where agents choose to interact with only those neighbors who voted, again conditional
on both supporting the same party. This is the case when λHαH + (1−λH)αL ≥ d and
(1− λL)αH + λLαL ≤ d.14
3.2 First-stage equilibrium
In this subsection, we compute the expected benefit of voting, given the second period
equilibrium. Then, we show the existence of the most interesting type of equilibrium.
In equilibrium, an individual votes if her expected benefit from voting exceeds her
cost of voting. Since the benefit of voting is independent of the cost, an equilibrium
voting strategy must be a threshold strategy like in Bo¨rgers (2004). So, there is some
c∗H such that s(H, ci) = 1 if ci < c
∗
H and s(H, ci) = 0 if ci > c
∗
H . Similarly, there is
some c∗L such that s(L, ci) = 1 if ci < c
∗
L and s(L, ci) = 0 if ci > c
∗
L. Hence, the ex ante
probability that any individual votes is p = qF (c∗H) + (1− q)F (c∗L). For 0 < p < 1, the
posterior beliefs that a neighbor who voted is of high type, i.e. λH , and that a neighbor
who did not vote is of low type, i.e. λL, are then given as follows by Bayes’ rule:
λH =
qF (c∗H)
qF (c∗H) + (1− q)F (c∗L)
(3)
λL =
(1− q)(1− F (c∗L))
(1− q)(1− F (c∗L)) + q(1− F (c∗H))
(4)
The expected benefit of voting is the payoff difference between voting and abstaining
from voting and it is composed of two parts. The first one which we call the expected
14The analysis on all possible equilibria of the second stage game is given in Aytimur, Boukouras,
and Schwager (2012). We omit the analysis of all other cases here either because they involve no
signaling benefit (agents interact either with all agents or none) or because they are not possible when
the first stage is considered (agents interact only with those who did not vote).
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electoral benefit arises because one’s vote can possibly change the electoral outcome.
This is the standard benefit of voting in the literature. The second one which we call
as the expected signaling benefit arises because one’s vote can possibly change one’s
outcome from the social interaction stage.
The expected electoral benefit of voting of an individual i is positive only if individual
i is pivotal. This happens if her preferred party receives either the same number of votes
as the other party or receives one less vote than the other party among the voters but
her. In both cases, by voting for her preferred party, she increases the probability that
her preferred party wins by 1/2. Taking into account that her benefit is ατ(i)w1 if her
preferred party wins and 0 otherwise, we get that the electoral benefit of voting is equal
to 1
2
ατ(i)w1Π(p), where Π(p) is the probability that individual i is pivotal. Bo¨rgers
(2004) gives the exact expression for Π(p) and shows that it is a differentiable and
decreasing function for all p ∈ (0, 1).15
With respect to the expected signaling benefit, we should keep in mind that only
voters match among each other, conditional on preferring the same party. Hence, if
an individual votes, she matches with all the same party voters in her neighborhood.
Her expected payoff from a single match is w2ατ(i)[λHαH + (1 − λH)αL − d] and the
expected number of the same party voters (and so of matches) in her neighborhood but
her is p(n− 1)/2. Hence, if she votes, this gives her an expected payoff of w2ατ(i)[p(n−
1)/2][λHαH + (1 − λH)αL − d] in the second period. If she does not vote, she does
not match with anyone, so her payoff is 0 in the second period. The payoff difference
between the two cases where she votes or does not vote gives the expected signaling
benefit of voting.
We denote by Bτ(i)(cH , cL) the total expected benefit of voting of an individual i
with type τ(i) as a function of the thresholds cH and cL. An equilibrium is given by
thresholds c∗H and c
∗
L such that Bτ(i)(c
∗
H , c
∗
L) ≥ ci for all i who vote and Bτ(i)(c∗H , c∗L) ≤ ci
for all i who abstain.
For the second period equilibrium described in Section 3.1 (where only same party
voters match among each other), we have the following total expected benefit of voting,
where the ex ante voting probability of an individual, p, and posterior probabilities that
a voter is of high type, λH , and that a non-voter is of low type, λL, are functions of cH
15Since it is enough for our purposes to know that Π(p) is differentiable and decreasing for all
p ∈ (0, 1), in order to save space, we do not reproduce it here and we refer the interested reader to
Bo¨rgers (2004).
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and cL:
Bτ(i)(cH , cL) = ατ(i)
{
w1
2
Π(p) +
1
2
w2p(n− 1)[λHαH + (1− λH)αL − d]
}
(5)
We observe that BL = µBH where µ = αL/αH < 1. Depending on the levels of cmin
and cmax, there are many possible first-period equilibria. However, since BH > BL,
turnout ratio of high type individuals is at least as high as turnout ratio of low type
individuals in any equilibrium.
More specifically, there are six possible types of first period equilibria: equilibria
where (i) everyone votes, (ii) nobody votes, (iii) all high type individuals vote and none
of low type individuals votes, (iv) all high type individuals vote and some of low type
individuals vote, (v) some of high type individuals vote and none of low type individuals
votes, (vi) some of high type individuals and some of low type individuals vote.
However, since we are interested in the signaling value of voting, the most interesting
implications of the model come from the last type of equilibrium, where a fraction of
each type, strictly between zero and one, of individuals vote. We call these equilibria
as interior equilibria. Moreover, if one makes the plausible assumption that the costs of
voting are distributed between zero and infinity for both types, then we can show that
our model permits only interior equilibria. Within the class of interior equilibria, we
focus on interior equilibria where only voters who prefer the same party match among
each other in the second period. We call these equilibria as interior equilibria with
signaling.
An interior equilibrium implies c∗L = µc
∗
H since BL = µBH . Then, we can summarize
the condition for an interior equilibrium as follows:
BH(c
∗
H , µc
∗
H) = c
∗
H (6)
where cmin/µ < c
∗
H < cmax. Then, BL(c
∗
H , c
∗
L) = c
∗
L and cmin < c
∗
L < cmax follow imme-
diately. Such an equilibrium is stable if after a slight increase (decrease) in cH , and the
corresponding increase (decrease) in cL = µcH , the benefit from voting falls short of
(exceeds) the cost so that the share of voters falls (rises) back to the equilibrium. For-
mally, defining BH(cH) ≡ BH(cH , µcH) for all cH , we we can write the expected benefit
for type H as a function of only the cutoff cH . With this definition, the equilibrium is
stable if ∂BH
∂cH
− 1 < 0.
In order to show that the subsequent analysis of stable interior equilibria is well
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founded, we complete this section by proving that such an equilibrium exists for some
parameter values of the model. For this purpose, consider the following inequalities:
BH(cmin/µ, cmin) = αH
{w1
2
Π(qF (cmin/µ)) (7)
+
1
2
w2qF (cmin/µ)(n− 1)[αH − d]
}
> cmin/µ
BH(cmax, µcmax) = αH
{w1
2
Π(q + (1− q)F (µcmax)) (8)
+
1
2
w2(n− 1)[q(αH − d)− (1− q)F (µcmax)(d− αL)]
}
< cmax
(1− q)F (µcH)
qF (cH)
≤ αH − d
d− αL ≤
(1− q)(1− F (µcH))
q(1− F (cH)) (9)
Note that the inequalities in (9) are equivalent to the inequalities, λHαH+(1−λH)αL ≥
d and (1 − λL)αH + λLαL ≤ d, which ensure that only neighbors who voted and who
support the same party match among each other in the second period. Inequalities (7)
and (8) are boundary conditions requiring that the benefit of voting exceeds (falls short
of) the cost of voting if the turnout is very low (very high).
Proposition 1
(i) If inequality (9) holds for all cH ∈ [cmin/µ, cmax], and inequalities (7) and (8)
hold, then a stable interior equilibrium with signaling exists.
(ii) There exist parameter values of the model which satisfy simultaneously the above
inequalities.
4 Comparative statics
In this section, we provide the main comparative statics of stable interior equilibria
with signaling, which have been shown to exist in the previous section, and discuss
some possible extensions of the model.
4.1 Direct effects
By substituting the posterior beliefs (3) and (4) in equation (5) and by linking the cut-
off value of low types to the cut-off value of high types via cL = µcH , the equilibrium
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condition (6) can be formulated as:
BH(c∗H) ≡ BH(c∗H , µc∗H)
= αH
{w1
2
Π [qF (c∗H) + (1− q)F (µc∗H)]
+
1
2
w2(n− 1)[qF (c∗H)(αH − d) + (1− q)F (µc∗H)(αL − d)]
}
= c∗H (10)
By using the implicit function theorem one can compute the effect of a change of a
parameter, say x, on the equilibrium cutoff c∗H :
dc∗H
dx
= −
∂BH
∂x
∂BH
∂cH
− 1 (11)
with
∂BH
∂cH
=αH
{w1
2
Π′(p) [qf(c∗H) + (1− q)µf(µc∗H)]
+
1
2
w2(n− 1)[qf(c∗H)(αH − d) + (1− q)µf(µc∗H)(αL − d)]
}
(12)
Since we are considering a stable equilibrium of the game, we know that ∂BH/∂cH < 1,
so that the denominator of (11) is negative. Therefore, the change of the equilibrium
cutoff c∗H has the same sign as the change of the total expected utility (BH) with respect
to the parameter x. Also, recall that p∗ = qF (c∗H) + (1− q)F (µc∗H). As a consequence,
we have the following comparative statics of the model:
(i) dp
∗
dd
< 0: An increase in the cost of the second stage interaction decreases the value
of signaling and equilibrium turnout.
(ii) dp
∗
dw1
> 0 and dp
∗
dw2
> 0: Directly increasing the significance that voters put in the
election or in the neighborhood interactions increases equilibrium turnout.
(iii) dp
∗
dN
< 0 but dp
∗
dn
> 0: Increasing the size of the electorate reduces the probability
of being pivotal and hence the electoral benefit and thus equilibrium turnout decrease.
However, due to the value of signaling, the paradox of not voting does not arise even if
N is arbitrarily large. This is because, even though agents cannot affect the outcome
of the election, they receive strictly positive utility by signaling their type to other
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agents. On the other hand, an increase in the number of neighbors increases the value
of signaling and equilibrium turnout.
(iv) dp
∗
dq
> 0:16 Since in equilibrium, high type individuals are more likely to vote than
low type individuals, shifting the prior towards the high type tends to increase total
turnout. This affects electoral and signaling benefits so that the cutoffs c∗H and c
∗
L
may decrease. However, as shown in the Appendix, this can never outweigh the direct
impact of higher q on total turnout.
(v) dp
∗
dαH
> 0, but dp
∗
dαL
cannot be signed: If αH increases, the benefit from voting of a
high type agent rises directly with αH . Moreover, since the ratio of low to high type
individuals among the voters is reduced along with µ, the signaling benefit increases.
Therefore, the turnout of high types unambiguously rises after an increase in αH . The
low type agents will also enjoy a higher signaling benefit, but their electoral benefit
decreases because of the increase in turnout by the high type individuals. If this impact
is large enough, turnout of low types may decrease. This can, however, not go so far
that total turnout were to decrease, since then the electoral benefit of low types would
be higher than in the original equilibrium, which would contradict the fact that their
turnout decreases. Thus, an increase in αH may decrease the turnout of the low type,
but not total turnout.
An increase in αL has the same kind of effects on the turnout of low type agents
as αH has on high types. However, one of these effects is negative: Along with µ,
the ratio of low to high types among the voters now increases, thereby reducing the
signaling benefit. If this effect is strong, we cannot rule out that total benefit of low
type agents decreases when αL increases. If this occurs, the turnout of low type agents,
and with it also the turnout of high types, decrease so that total turnout may decrease
as a response to a higher αL.
4.2 Interaction of signaling and electoral incentives
After discussing these direct comparative static effects, we turn to the more subtle,
and possibly even more interesting, indirect effects. Specifically, we want to investigate
whether our model can generate a bandwagon effect, i.e. whether a voter is more likely
to vote when there is higher turnout. Note that in the absence of signaling, this is
16The computations and more detailed explanations for (iv) and (v) are in the Appendix.
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impossible, since higher turnout decreases the pivotal probability of a voter, who is then
less likely to vote. In addition, we show that the bandwagon effect can be substantial:
A small increase of the election’s significance (w1) can cause a substantial increase in
the turnout ratio. Note again that this cannot be the case in the absence of signaling,
since the effect of w1 is downgraded by small pivotal probabilities.
In order to show these results, we need to examine the interaction between electoral
and signaling incentives in our model: How does the presence of signaling change the
sensitivity of turnout to the importance of the election outcome? In other words, we
would like to investigate the conditions under which the presence of signaling in a voting
game reinforces or dampens the sensitivity of turnout to the electoral incentives. This
is an interesting question on its own right, both in terms of empirical implications (are
countries with better connected communities expected to have more volatile turnout?)
and in terms of policy implications (should governments adopt community friendly
policies to increase the sensitivity of voters to political issues?). For brevity, whenever
the sensitivity of the turnout to electoral incentives increases with signaling we say that
we have a reinforcing signaling effect, while whenever the sensitivity of the turnout to
electoral incentives decreases with signaling we say that we have a dampening signaling
effect.
4.2.1 Reinforcing or dampening signaling effects
In terms of formal analysis, we study whether signaling is reinforcing or dampening
by examining how the change of the equilibrium cutoff c∗H due to an increase in the
significance of the elections is affected by an increase in the value of signaling. Therefore,
if
d2c∗H
dw1dw2
> 0 we have reinforcing signaling and if
d2c∗H
dw1dw2
< 0 we have dampening
signaling. Since an increase in the equilibrium cut-off value c∗H always increases the
equilibrium turnout p∗ for given values of q, αH and αL, examining the effect on c∗H
also gives us the impact on p∗. By setting x = w1 and by taking the derivative of (11)
with respect to w2 we find:
d2c∗H
dw1dw2
=
∂2BH
∂cH∂w2
∂BH
∂w1(
∂BH
∂cH
− 1
)2
Since the denominator and ∂BH
∂w1
are both positive, the sign of the expression above has
the same sign as ∂
2BH
∂cH∂w2
. By computing the latter cross-derivative from equation (12)
and rearranging we find that we have reinforcing signaling if and only if (recall that
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µ = αL/αH):
(αH − d)qf(c∗H) + (αL − d)(1− q)µf(µc∗H) > 0 (13)
Inequality (13) illustrates the interaction of electoral and signaling incentives. When
the election importance (w1) increases, there are qf(c
∗
H)/2 additional individuals of high
type per party, and (1− q)µf(µc∗H)/2 additional individuals of low type per party who
decide to vote. Inequality (13) states that the expected payoff of matching with these
additional voters is positive. In this case, the expected signaling benefit of voting
increases, which reinforces the increase in turnout due to the higher importance of the
election.
Solving inequality (13) for the parameter d, the cost of social interaction, we find
a critical threshold value (let us call it α˜), such that if d is below this threshold, then
we have reinforcing signaling, while if d is above this threshold we have dampening
signaling. We summarize this result in the following proposition, which is directly
derived from the analysis so far:
Proposition 2 In any stable interior equilibrium with signaling, we have a reinforcing
signaling effect whenever the cost of social interaction d is below the threshold value α˜
and dampening signaling otherwise, with
α˜ ≡ αHqf(c
∗
H) + αL(1− q)µf(µc∗H)
qf(c∗H) + (1− q)µf(µc∗H)
(14)
Note that, if we define 1
2
w2p(n − 1)[λHαH + (1 − λH)αL − d] in equation (5) as the
signaling benefit of voting, then it is easy to show that:
∂2BH
∂cH∂w2
=
1
w2
∂(signaling benefit)
∂cH
Hence, if an increase in the total turnout has a positive effect on the value of signaling,
then this implies that signaling has a reinforcing effect on voting. The interpretation
is that if the significance of the elections increases (w1 increases) then turnout will
increase because the overall expected benefit for voters increases. But whether this
effect is larger or smaller than in a society where the signaling benefit is absent (i.e.
Bo¨rgers 2004) or where communities are less important (lower value of w2), depends
on the impact of the increased turnout on the signaling benefit. If turnout has a
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positive impact on signaling then the increase in turnout will be greater in the society
with stronger community ties (
d2c∗H
dw1dw2
> 0), because the initial increase in the value of
voting is further reinforced by the fact that voting is also more beneficial for signaling
one’s type to her neighbors. Of course, the opposite is true if the signaling benefit is
negatively affected by higher turnout.
Proposition 2 makes clear that in a society where the cost of social interactions is
low (d < α˜), for instance due to inadequate substitutes to social interactions or because
of well-established communication channels, signaling has a reinforcing effect, while the
opposite is true for a society with high cost of social interactions. Hence, we expect the
turnout ratio to be more sensitive to the importance of the election outcome in societies
with low cost of social interactions.
Beyond this general result, it is worthwhile to investigate in more detail whether,
and in what circumstances, the condition d < α˜ is likely to be satisfied in an equilibrium
with signaling. To answer this question, we relate α˜ to the inequalities laid down in
Section 3.1: λHαH + (1 − λH)αL ≥ d and (1 − λL)αH + λLαL ≤ d. These inequalities
implicitly define an interval [dL, dH ], within which the cost d of the match must lie for an
equilibrium with signaling to obtain. If α˜ is greater than the upper bound of the interval
[dL, dH ], i.e. α˜ > dH , then signaling has a reinforcing effect on voting irrespectively of
the other parameters of the model. If α˜ is lower than the lower bound of the interval,
i.e. α˜ < dL, then signaling has a dampening effect on voting, irrespectively of the other
parameters of the model, and if α˜ is in the interior of the interval, the effect of signaling
is either reinforcing or dampening, depending on the other parameters of the model.
The following proposition relates these cases to the distribution of voting costs:17
Proposition 3 Consider an interior equilibrium with signaling. If for all cH ∈ [cmin, cmax]:
(i) f(cH)
F (cH)
> µf(µcH)
F (µcH)
, then the effect of signaling is reinforcing;
(ii) f(cH)
1−F (cH) >
µf(µcH)
1−F (µcH) and
f(cH)
F (cH)
< µf(µcH)
F (µcH)
, then the effect of signaling is reinforcing
for some parameter values and dampening for the rest;
(iii) f(cH)
1−F (cH) <
µf(µcH)
1−F (µcH) , then the effect of signaling is dampening.
17As can be seen in the proof, the conditions mentioned in (i) to (iii) actually need only be satisfied
at the cutoff value for the high types corresponding to the equilibrium under consideration. However,
to facilitate interpretation, we state these inequalities globally.
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Note that the first condition of part (ii) in Proposition 3 is implied by the increasing
hazard rate property. This means that, if the distribution of voting costs displays an
increasing hazard rate, then signaling has a reinforcing effect at least if the cost of social
interactions, d, is small enough. On the other hand, ensuring that all the stable interior
equilibria of the model for any set of parameter values exhibit reinforcing signaling
requires the condition of part (i). This condition, which is a weaker version of the
increasing “reverse” hazard rate, is stronger than condition (ii). If (i) fails but the first
condition in (ii) holds, then whether signaling has a reinforcing or dampening effect
depends on d, as given in Proposition 2.
To see which is the most relevant case, observe that the most commonly used dis-
tributions in the literature, such as the uniform, the normal and the exponential dis-
tribution, do not satisfy the increasing reverse hazard rate property, but satisfy the
condition of part (ii). Thus, it is reasonable to expect case (ii) to occur, which means
that the cost of social interaction is indeed crucial for signaling to have a reinforcing
effect on electoral incentives.
4.2.2 Bandwagon effect
Next, we investigate whether there can be a bandwagon effect in our model. Mathemat-
ically, a bandwagon effect exists if and only if18 ∂BH
∂cH
> 0, i.e. higher turnout increases
the voting benefit of a voter. Recall that ∂BH
∂cH
is given by (12), which is reproduced
below for convenience:
∂BH
∂cH
=αH
{w1
2
Π′(p) [qf(c∗H) + (1− q)µf(µc∗H)]
+
1
2
w2(n− 1)[qf(c∗H)(αH − d) + (1− q)µf(µc∗H)(αL − d)]
}
Since Π′(p) is negative, the first term in the curly brackets is negative. This term
shows that electoral benefit decreases with higher turnout. The second term, which
corresponds to the change of signaling benefit, is positive if and only if signaling is rein-
forcing, i.e. inequality (13) holds. Hence, a necessary condition for a bandwagon effect
(∂BH
∂cH
> 0) is reinforcing signaling. Given that signaling is reinforcing, a bandwagon
effect exists as long as the second term is higher in absolute value than the first term.
This arises, for instance, if w2 is high relative to w1Π
′(p)/2, that is, if social interactions
18Expressing this condition in terms of the voting benefit of a high type agent is sufficient, since the
voting benefit of a low type agent is proportional.
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are important compared to the impact of an increase in turnout on the electoral benefit.
The intuition is as follows: With a higher turnout, electoral benefit of a voter
decreases due to a smaller pivotal probability. However, if signaling benefit increases
with a higher turnout, or equivalently if signaling is reinforcing, then the bandwagon
effect may arise. The bandwagon effect exists when the increase in signaling benefit is
higher in magnitude than the decrease in electoral benefit.
4.2.3 Magnitude of dc∗H/dw1
Until here, we were interested in the sign of various effects. Finally, we analyze the
magnitude of the increase in turnout ratio due to a small increase in the election’s
significance (w1). Note that in a model of voting which does not include signaling
benefit, the response of turnout to changes of w1 is small due to low pivotal probabilities
for voters. Therefore, it is important to see whether the inclusion of the signaling benefit
can change this result.
As we showed earlier, the election’s significance becomes more important for turnout
ratio when signaling is reinforcing. Indeed, if this reinforcement is strong enough so
that there exists an important bandwagon effect, a small change in the importance of
the election may have a large impact on equilibrium turnout. Mathematically, replacing
x by w1 in equation (11) gives:
dc∗H
dw1
= −
∂BH
∂w1
∂BH
∂cH
− 1 (15)
where ∂BH
∂cH
is given in equation (12) and ∂BH
∂w1
is given by ∂BH
∂w1
= αH
2
Π(p). Since Π(p)
is relatively small, the numerator in equation (15) is expected to be small. In the
absence of signaling benefit (w2 = 0), the denominator in absolute value is higher
than 1, since ∂BH
∂cH
is negative. This leads to a low magnitude of
dc∗H
dw1
. However, in the
presence of signaling, if signaling is reinforcing, ∂BH
∂cH
can be arbitrarily close to 1 (a
stable equilibrium implies that ∂BH
∂cH
< 1). From (12), one sees again that this occurs
if the importance of social interactions w2 is large relative to w1Π
′(p)/2, the change in
electoral benefit induced by an increase in turnout. If this is the case, one has a small
denominator in absolute value and therefore an important magnitude of
dc∗H
dw1
.
The intuition behind this result is that, if social interactions are very important
for voters relative to turnout-induced changes in electoral benefit (high w2 and low
w1Π
′(p)/2), then even a small increase in the importance of the election may generate a
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large increase in turnout, because of the importance of signaling effects. In other words,
since voters expect other voters to turn out in higher numbers, their own incentive to
vote increases significantly due to signaling purposes and this may generate a substantial
increase on total turnout.
4.3 Extensions and discussion
To conclude the analysis, we discuss two assumptions of our model, and consider pos-
sible extensions along these lines.19 First, the present paper considers symmetric party
support in the sense that every voter prefers each party with probability 1/2. This
choice is motivated, like in Bo¨rgers (2004), by our focus on total turnout, and by our
aim to highlight the implications of signaling on aggregate voting incentives. Moreover,
the case of symmetric party support appears to be of particular political relevance,
since in many countries, most notably in the U.S., the electorates are almost evenly
split between left and right wing political camps, and elections are consequently tight.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to discuss how signaling might affect turnout in a model
with asymmetric party support. To get a feeling for the forces at work in such a model,
assume that an exogenous shock makes the election more important, thereby raising
the incentives to turn out for supporters of both parties. However, when supporters
of the majority party vote in larger numbers, supporters of the minority party are less
likely to be pivotal, because their expected number of votes falls even farther behind
the expected number of votes for the majority (see Taylor and Yildirim 2010, Lemma
1 (ii), p. 460). This decreases the incentives for the minority to turn out, and even
more so if the marginal voters of the minority party are valuable interaction partners,
i.e., whenever an inequality like (13) holds for these voters. Thus, the initial increase
in turnout of the minority is dampened by a feedback of the majority’s turnout on the
minority’s pivotal probability. As a consequence, a condition like (13) is not sufficient
any more for a reinforcing effect of signaling.
In order for such a feedback effect to overturn the result of Proposition 2, however,
the asymmetry has to be large. In fact, one can show that signaling has a reinforcing
effect on turnout if for supporters of both parties conditions analogous to (13) hold,
provided that the ex ante support for the parties is close enough to 1/2. Thus, our
analysis is robust to small deviations from the assumption of symmetric party support,
thereby covering the empirically relevant case of tight elections.
19Details are available from the authors upon request.
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As a second modification, one could think of formulating an interaction payoff dif-
ferent from (1). We experimented with (i) a Cobb-Douglas formulation: w2(α
γ
i α
1−γ
j −
d), γ < 1/2, and (ii) a linear formulation such that for high types: w2(γαHαj − d),
for low-types: w2(αLαj − d), with αL/αH < γ < 1. Now if (i) in the Cobb-Douglas
specification, γ is close to 1/2, and (ii) in the linear specification, γ is close to 1, then
the decision whether to interact or not is almost entirely driven by one’s own rather
than the partner’s type. As a consequence, signaling will not occur since it is not
relevant whether one is considered to be an attractive partner. Conversely, in these
specifications, analogous versions of Proposition 2 and the ensuing bandwagon effect
can be derived, provided that the partner’s type is sufficiently relevant for the interac-
tion benefit, that is, γ is low enough.
5 Conclusion
The paper presents a formal model of voting as signaling device. By observing the voting
behavior of others in their social circle, voters receive a signal about their ‘neighbor’s’
value in social interactions. This generates an additional incentive to vote, apart from
affecting the outcome of the election, as the early rational voting theory predicts. This
additional incentive can account for the paradox of not voting in large societies and
the role of social pressures in electoral turnouts. Moreover, the model generates several
predictions which are consistent with empirical findings.
We believe that the model can be extended in order to shed light on the interaction
between voting incentives and the role of political parties. In our model, the importance
of the election is taken as an exogenous parameter. In reality it is affected by political
campaigns and advertising.20 If social interactions can have a substantial impact on
voting incentives and electoral turnout, as our model suggests, how do political parties
strategically allocate their resources to mobilize their voters? And how is the degree
of contestability in a constituency related to the importance of social interactions?
Our analysis suggests that signaling incentives may be an important factor in such
considerations.
20For some recent papers on these topics see Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2012) and Morton and
Myerson (2012).
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Appendix
A First-stage equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) When we plot BH(cH) on cmin/µ < cH < cmax, the intersection c∗H with the 45◦
line would be an interior equilibrium satisfying (6). By the continuity of BH(cH) on
the interval [cmin/µ, cmax], if BH(cmin/µ) > cmin/µ (i.e. the starting point is above the
45◦ line) and BH(cmax) < cmax (i.e. the ending point is below the 45◦ line), then at
least one such intersection exists. Moreover, since at least one intersection is such that
BH(cH) cuts the 45◦ line from above, a stable interior equilibrium exists if these two
conditions are satisfied. In an interior equilibrium with signaling, the second period
benefit is 1
2
w2p(n − 1)[λHαH + (1 − λH)αL − d]. With the cutoff points cH = cmin/µ
and cL = cmin, p is equal to p = qF (cmin/µ) and λH is equal to λH = 1. With the
cutoff points cH = cmax and cL = µcmax, p is equal to p = q + (1− q)F (µcmax) and λH
is equal to λH =
q
q+(1−q)F (µcmax) . Replacing p and λH in (5) and rearranging, one finds
that BH(cmin/µ) > cmin/µ and BH(cmax) < cmax are equivalent to inequalities (7) and
(8).
In addition, we have to make sure that this intersection c∗H gives an equilibrium
with signaling. This is the case if the two conditions λHαH + (1 − λH)αL ≥ d and
(1−λL)αH +λLαL ≤ d hold for all cH ∈ [cmin/µ, cmax] (i.e. for all possible intersection
points). These two conditions are equivalent to (9) holding for all cH ∈ [cmin/µ, cmax].
(ii) The lhs of inequality (7) is always positive. Hence, this inequality is satisfied
for low enough cmin. The lhs of inequality (8) is bounded above by αH
{
w1
2
+ 1
2
w2(n−
1)q(αH − d)
}
. Hence, this inequality is satisfied for high enough cmax.
The lhs of inequality (9) is lower than (1 − q)/q since F (µcH) < F (cH) for all
cH ∈ [cmin/µ, cmax]. Similarly, the rhs of inequality (9) is greater than (1 − q)/q since
1 − F (µcH) > 1 − F (cH) for all cH ∈ [cmin/µ, cmax]. Then, for instance, if d is such
that αH−d
d−αL =
1−q
q
(equivalently qαH + (1 − q)αL = d), both conditions are satisfied.
Hence, there is a neighborhood of values of d around qαH + (1 − q)αL in which both
conditions are satisfied. Note that this neighborhood for d is consistent with the fact
that inequalities (7) and (8) hold for some parameter values, since the latter inequalities
are satisfied by appropriate choice of cmin and cmax, irrespective of d. 
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B Comparative statics
In this subsection of the Appendix, for ease of exposition, we write cH and cL to denote
the equilibrium cutoffs instead of c∗H and c
∗
L.
Claim (iv): dp
∗
dq
> 0.
Proof: dp∗/dq is given by
dp∗
dq
= F (cH)− F (µcH) + dcH
dq
[qf(cH) + (1− q)µf(µcH)]
We can compute dcH/dq by using equations (11) and (12) where ∂BH/∂q is given by
∂BH
∂q
=αH
{w1
2
Π′(p)[F (cH)− F (µcH)] + w2
2
(n− 1)[F (cH)(αH − d)− F (µcH)(αL − d)]}
Notice that the first term in ∂BH/∂q is negative, while the second term is positive. If,
for example, w2 (w1) is sufficiently large, one obtains dcH/dq > 0 (< 0).
However, we now show that total turnout always increases. Replacing the value of
dcH/dq in the above expression for dp
∗/dq, we find that dp∗/dq has the same sign as[
F (cH)− F (µcH)
][
1− αH
{w1
2
Π′(p)
[
qf(cH) + (1− q)µf(µcH)
]
+
w2
2
(n− 1)[qf(cH)(αH − d) + (1− q)µf(µcH)(αL − d)]}]
+
[
qf(cH) + (1− q)µf(µcH)
][
αH
{w1
2
Π′(p)
[
F (cH)− F (µcH)
]
+
w2
2
(n− 1)[F (cH)(αH − d)− F (µcH)(αL − d)]}]
By lengthy but simple algebraic manipulations, it can be shown that the above
expression and hence dp∗/dq are always positive. 
Claim (v): dp
∗
dαH
> 0 but dp
∗
dαL
cannot be signed.
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Proof: ∂BH
∂αH
is given by
∂BH
∂αH
=
{w1
2
Π(p) +
w2
2
(n− 1)[qF (cH)(αH − d) + (1− q)F (µcH)(αL − d)]
}
+
αH
{w1
2
Π′(p)(1− q)f(µcH)
(
− αLcH
α2H
)
+
w2
2
(n− 1)
[
qF (cH) + (1− q)f(µcH)(αL − d)
(
− αLcH
α2H
)]}
The term in the first bracket is the impact through the individual’s own preference
parameter, and the term w2
2
(n− 1)qF (cH) is the impact of the partners’ parameter on
the signaling benefit. The terms involving −αLcH
α2H
are the effects of a decrease in the
cutoff cL on the electoral and signaling benefits, which occurs so as to maintain the
relationship cL = µcH which must always hold in an equilibrium. Since all terms are
positive, one has dcH/dαH > 0.
Similar to BH(cH), we define BL(cL) as
BL(cL) ≡ BL(cL/µ, cL) (B.1)
= αL
{w1
2
Π(p) +
w2
2
(n− 1)[qF (cL/µ)(αH − d) + (1− q)F (cL)(αL − d)]}
The second term in this benefit is the signaling benefit which increases after an increase
in αH . The electoral benefit in the first term decreases if and only if Π(p) increases.
Thus, dcL/dαH may be negative. However, if total turnout p were to decrease, then
Π(p), and hence all terms in (B.1), would increase, which together with dcH/dαH > 0
yields a contradiction.
From (B.1), we obtain
∂BL
∂αL
=
{w1
2
Π(p) +
w2
2
(n− 1)[qF (cL/µ)(αH − d) + (1− q)F (cL)(αL − d)]
}
+ (B.2)
αL
{w1
2
Π′(p)qf(cL/µ)
(−cLαH
α2L
)
+
w2
2
(n− 1)
[
(1− q)F (cL) + qf(cL/µ)(αH − d)
(−cLαH
α2L
)]}
The last term in (B.2) expresses the impact of an increase in αL via the associated
change in the share of high type agents among the interaction partners, and is negative.
If the weight w2 on signaling is large and if the density of cost f(cL/µ) happens to be
large at the original equilibrium, then (B.2) may turn negative, so that dcL/dαL need
not be positive. 
Proof of Proposition 3: First we derive the thresholds dH and dL from the two
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conditions given at the end of Subsection 3.1 as a function of the cutoff value cH for
the high types in the equilibrium under consideration. To do this, we substitute the
relevant values for λH and λL into λHαH +(1−λH)αL ≥ d and (1−λL)αH +λLαL ≤ d:
dH = λHαH + (1− λH)αL
⇒ dH = qF (cH)
qF (cH) + (1− q)F (µcH)αH +
(
1− qF (cH)
qF (cH) + (1− q)F (µcH)
)
αL
⇒ dH = αHqF (cH) + αL(1− q)F (µcH)
qF (cH) + (1− q)F (µcH)
Similarly:
dL = (1− λL)αH + λLαL ⇒ dL = αHq(1− F (cH)) + αL(1− q)(1− F (µcH))
q(1− F (cH)) + (1− q)(1− F (µcH))
For part (i), suppose that f(cH)/F (cH) ≥ µf(µcH)/F (µcH). One has
f(cH)
F (cH)
> (=)
µf(µcH)
F (µcH)
⇔ (αH − αL)f(cH)F (µcH) > (=)(αH − αL)µf(µcH)F (cH)
⇔ αHf(cH)F (µcH) + αLµf(µcH)F (cH) > (=)αHµf(µcH)F (cH) + αLf(cH)F (µcH)
Multiplying both sides by q(1−q) and adding αHq2f(cH)F (cH) and αL(1−q)2µf(µcH)F (µcH)
on both sides yields:
αHq
2f(cH)F (cH) + αHq(1− q)f(cH)F (µcH)
+αLq(1− q)µf(µcH)F (cH) + αL(1− q)2µf(µcH)F (µcH)
> (=) αHq
2f(cH)F (cH) + αHq(1− q)µf(µcH)F (cH)
+αLq(1− q)f(cH)F (µcH) + αL(1− q)2µf(µcH)F (µcH)
⇔ [αHqf(cH) + αL(1− q)µf(µcH)][qF (cH) + (1− q)F (µcH)]
> (=)
[
αHqF (cH) + αL(1− q)F (µcH)
][
qf(cH) + (1− q)µf(µcH)
]
⇔ αHqf(cH) + αL(1− q)µf(µcH)
qf(cH) + (1− q)µf(µcH) > (=)
αHqF (cH) + αL(1− q)F (µcH)
qF (cH) + (1− q)F (µcH)
⇔ α˜ > (=) dH
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From the lines above, we conclude more specifically that
f(cH)
F (cH)
> (=)
µf(µcH)
F (µcH)
⇔ α˜ > (=) dH
When α˜ is greater than (resp. equal to) dH , this implies that any value of d that satisfies
the equilibrium conditions also satisfies d < α˜ (resp. d ≤ α˜) . Hence d2c∗H
dw1dw2
> 0 (resp.
≥ 0).
For part (ii), note first that the above argument implies α˜ < dH . Furthermore,
substitute in the proof above the terms 1−F (cH) and 1−F (µcH) for the terms F (cH)
and F (µcH) respectively and iterate the same steps. Then we obtain:
f(cH)
1− F (cH) > (=)
µf(µcH)
1− F (µcH)
⇔ αHqf(cH) + αL(1− q)µf(µcH)
qf(cH) + (1− q)µf(µcH) > (=)
αHq(1− F (cH)) + αL(1− q)(1− F (µcH))
q(1− F (cH)) + (1− q)(1− F (µcH))
⇔ α˜ > (=) dL
When α˜ is greater than dL, the cost of the match d may satisfy d < α˜ or not. This
depends on the other parameters of the model. Hence, either
d2c∗H
dw1dw2
≥ 0 or d2c∗H
dw1dw2
< 0.
When α˜ is equal to dL, d ≥ α˜. Hence, d
2c∗H
dw1dw2
≤ 0.
Finally, part (iii) follows from part (ii). This is because when the initial condition of
part (ii) does not hold, then α˜ < dL, which implies that the condition d ≤ α˜ is mutually
exclusive with the equilibrium conditions.
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